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Does the LEOSA Carry Law Apply to You? Article. January 1. James M. Baranowski. Photo: Police File. Having served in the Marine Corps, I am familiar with the perils of scuttlebutt, an old Navy term for water cooler talk that now means rumors and gossip.
In law enforcement, a lot of the recent scuttlebutt focuses on off- duty and retired officer carry laws, covering what you can and cannot do under the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act (LEOSA). Signed into law on July 2. President George W. Bush and codified as 1. U. S. C. §§ 9. 26. B & C, LEOSA was intended to afford qualified active (QLEO) and qualified retired law enforcement officers (QRLEO) the privilege of carrying a concealed firearm in all 5. District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and all other U.
S. possessions (except the Canal Zone) notwithstanding any other provision of the law of any state or political subdivision thereof. LEOSA sounds pretty cut and dried. But unfortunately, it isn't.
Vague language, confusing amendments, and a relative shortage of interpretive case law have allowed scuttlebutt and confusion to take over common sense application of its principles. And clarifying this law and what it means for law enforcement officers and retired law enforcement officers is a large part of my job as attorney for the National Rifle Association. Qualification Requirements. Initially intended to apply only to people who are QLEO and QRLEO, LEOSA was amended in both 2. DOD police and law enforcement officers. In addition, LEOSA now applies for active law enforcement officers of the Amtrak Police Department, Federal Reserve, and executive branch of the Federal Government, even if they lack statutory powers of arrest.
In law enforcement, a lot of the recent scuttlebutt focuses on off-duty and retired officer carry laws, covering what you can and cannot do under the Law Enforcement.
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However, because of a failure to remain consistent with the language used in both parts of the statute, those without arrest authority are unable to qualify upon separation. While many agencies argue that only full- time officers qualify for the privileges afforded by LEOSA, the plain language of the statute and case law interpreting it prove otherwise. In The People of the State of New York v.
Arthur Rodriguez (Indictment # 2. NY. Sup. Ct. 2. 00. New York Supreme Court found that Rodriguez, a Pennsylvania Constable (despite constables not being paid a salary by any municipal subdivision and working more like independent contractors paid on a per job basis), was in fact employed by the court and qualified for protection under LEOSA.
The U. S. Attorney for the District of Columbia took a similar position in an amicus brief filed in the Superior Court of D. C. case of District of Columbia v. Barbusin (Criminal No.
CDC- 0. 09. 13). Barbusin, a special police officer of the District of Columbia Protective Services Police Department, asserted LEOSA protection following charges stemming from the alleged illegal possession of an assault weapon in the District. While the case was ultimately dismissed with prejudice due to Brady violations, the language of the government's amicus brief is instructive on the issue. In the brief, the government notes that LEOSA's definition of a "qualified law enforcement officer" is to be read broadly and that a defendant producing evidence supporting the performance of law enforcement activities such as those outlined in LEOSA satisfies "LEOSA's broad definition of a 'qualified law enforcement officer.'"Another argument frequently raised by agencies hostile to LEOSA is that an individual must possess both law enforcement authority and agency authorization to carry a firearm while off duty in order to qualify for LEOSA. In one of the few criminal cases to examine this issue, People v.
Booth, 8. 62 N. Y. S. 2d 7. 67, (NY. Co. Ct. 2. 00. 8), the defendant, a Coast Guard reservist, was charged with the crime of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree after a loaded handgun was found in a compartment underneath the seat of the vehicle in which he was traveling. Even though Booth was off duty at the time of his arrest and did not possess agency authority to carry while off duty, the Court found that Booth's duties in the Coast Guard, which were defined "as the prevention, detection, [and] investigation of violations of the law" as well as his "authority and duty to arrest violators" and qualification to carry a firearm, despite its time and place restrictions, qualified him for LEOSA and exempted him from prosecution under New York State Law.
Id. at 7. 70. Reliance on scuttlebutt surrounding qualification requirements and failing to recognize LEOSA's preemptive authority over state law can be costly. In People of the State of California v. Watch A Stork`S Journey IMDB more.
Jose Diaz, Case No. GF0. 04. 94 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2. 00. 7), a Coast Guard boarding officer was arrested under Cal. Pen. Code § 1. 20. A)(1) for carrying a loaded firearm in his vehicle while in a public place.
At the time of his arrest, Diaz was traveling with a cased firearm and loaded magazine in the back seat of his automobile. The charge was dismissed on oral motion by the prosecutor after it became evident to the City that LEOSA preempted Diaz's prosecution.
Diaz sued for a violation of his civil rights, Diaz v. City of San Fernando, et al., Case No. PC0. 44. 13. 9 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2. 01. 1). The civil suit settled outside of court, and the Settlement and Release Agreement entered into between Diaz and the City resulted in a $4. Diaz and a redraft of the City's police training standards on LEOSA. ID Issues. As members of the Coast Guard, both Booth and Diaz qualified for LEOSA prior to a recent amendment to the statute.
With the new language, however, they likely do not. On Jan. 2, 2. 01. LEOSA was amended to specifically allow for active and "retired" (as defined by LEOSA) military and DOD police and law enforcement officers with UCMJ (Uniform Code of Military Justice) apprehension authority to qualify for the statute; however, also hidden within the amendment was language mandating that all QLEOs now carry a photographic ID that "identifies the employee as a police or law enforcement officer of the agency," and that QRLEOs carry a photographic ID "that identifies the person as having been employed as a police or law enforcement officer."The DOD has not amended its own policy on LEOSA, DODI 5. A standard CAC or blue retiree card will not work for LEOSA purposes, as the photographic ID needed to identify the individual as either being actively or having once been employed as a police or law enforcement officer of the agency.
While enacted in an effort to limit the ability to qualify for LEOSA to only those military and DOD personnel that served in a police or law enforcement billet, this change will likely cause substantial difficulties for many non- DOD law enforcement officers that already have significant problems obtaining the required identification cards from their agencies, and especially for those who qualify but do not hold, or never held, the title of police or law enforcement officer. This problem is only compounded by the fact that LEOSA does not bestow either an explicit right to obtain the required photographic ID or a federal remedy for an agency's failure to issue one. This issue has been challenged multiple times in state court and the denying agency has always prevailed; first, in the 2.
Mc. Kinley v. City of Topeka, Case No. C- 3. 76, and then again in the 2. Moore, et al. V. Trent, et al, 2.
U. S. Dist. LEXIS 1. E. D. Illinois 2. Showtime Full Cradle Of Fear Online Free here.
Johnson v. NY State Dept. Corrections, 7. 09 F.
Supp. 2d 1. 78 (N. D. N. Y. 2. 01. 0).
In all of these cases it was found that as long as the agency's denial is not arbitrary or capricious there is no remedy available to the individual who is denied issuance of an identification card.